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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FUOCO, Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA I 
vs. , No. 
BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS and 
VERNA V. WILLIAMS, 
Def endants-Responden t.v. 
10362 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The trial court erred in holding that it was 
bound by the verdict of the jury in the first trial with 
respect to the location of the ditch. 
2. The respondents have failed to call attention in 
their brief to any evidence of mutual recognition of the 
ditch as a boundary line over a long period of time. 
1 
ARGU~IENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLD-
ING THAT IT WAS BOUND BY THE VER-
DICT OF THE JURY IN THE FIRST TRIAL 
WITH RESPECT TO THE LOCATION OF 
THE DITCH. 
The respondents argue, point A, that the trial 
court correctly relied upon the finding made by the 
jury in the first trial with respect to the location of 
the ditch which is claimed to be the boundary line. They 
then argue that the testimony of witnesses as to use of 
the land on each side of the disputed boundary line 
ditch relates to the ditch in the location found by the 
jury and not to a ditch in the location recalled by the 
witnesses. For example, on pages 8, 9 and 10 of the 
Respondents' Brief reference is made to the testimony 
of witnesses Owen Sanders, Frank Young and others re-
lating to use of the property east of the ditch as it existed 
20 feet east of the present ditch, and the impression 
is given that such testimony refers to the use of land 
east of the present ditch. 
The fact is that the second trial was a trial de novo. 
The findings of the jury in the first trial was not bind-
ing upon the litigants and the court in the second trial. 
In its memorandum decision dated February 19, 
1965, ( R. 26, 27) , the trial court said: 
"Much testimony was offered at the time of 
the trial of this m~;tter by the respective parties 
concerning the location of the irrigation ditch 
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in question. However, it would appear from the 
Supreme Court's decision that the matter of the 
location of the irrigation ditch had already been 
determined by the jury on the previous trial and 
that that question was not properly before the 
Trial Court in this matter .... " 
This was clearly error. 
The previous judgment of the district court was 
reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. 
The pertinent language is as fallows: 
"Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is 
reversed and remanded for a new trial, with in-
structions to the effect that the judge or jury 
should determine the matters of whether the ditch 
was acquiesced in over a long period of time, as a 
boundar.IJ and not simply as an irrigation me-
mium. Costs to appellants." 
The law is well settled in Utah as in other juris-
dictions that when a judgment is reversed it no longer 
has any force or e:ff ect for any purpose. 
I quote from Bouvier's Law dictionary: 
"Reverse, Reversed. A term frequently used 
in the judgments of an appellate court, in dis-
posing of the case before it. It then means 'to 
set aside, to annul, to vacate.' Laithe vs. McDon-
ald , 7 Kans. 254." 
In the case of Larsen vs. Gasberg, 30 Utah 470, 
86 P. 1906, the judgment of the district court was 
reversed. The precise language was: 
"The judgment is reversed, with directions to 
the lower court to grant a new trial." 
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At the subsequent trial the question was raised 
as to the effect of the reversal of the judgment. I quote: 
" ... What we do say is that we think it 
clearly appears from the opinion that the cause 
was remanded for a new trial to give the parties 
an opportunity to try the question of fraud, a 
matter concerning which appellant had not had 
his day in court. Let that be as it may, the 
judgment of the lower court was reversed and 
the cause remanded without any specific direc-
tions except that a new trial should be granted. 
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment 
is reversed and a new trial granted without any 
specific instructions or directions, the case stands 
in the lower court precisely as it did before a 
trial was had in the first instance. The general 
rule in this regard is well stated in 3 Ency. L. 
& P. 579, in the following language: 
'When a decree is reversed and the cause 
remanded without specific directions, the de-
cision of the court below is entirely abrogated, 
and the cause then stands in the court below 
precisely as if no trial had olcurred, and that 
court has the same power over the record as it 
had before its decree was rendered, and it may 
permit amendments to the pleadings to the 
same extent that it might have done before the 
trial, and in the exercise of the same discre-
tion, except that it is concluded by the legal 
principles announced by the appellate court. 
And where a cause is reversed and remanded 
with directions to proceed in conformity with 
the views expressed in the opinoin filed, and 
it appears from such opinion that the grounds 
of reversal are of a character which may be 
obviated by subsequent amendments of the 
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pleadings or the introduction of additional evi-
dence ,it is the duty of the trial court to permit 
the cause to be redocketed and to permit 
amendments to be made and evidence intro-
duced on the hearing just as though it was be-
ing heard for the first time' ... " 
In the case of Madsen vs. Madsen, 78 Utah 84, 
1 P.2d 946, the Supreme Court of Utah again had 
before it the question as to the intent of the appellate 
court in remanding a case. The court said: 
" ... The language used in the former deci-
sion seems to be clear and unequivocal. 'Ve can 
not see how it can be construed in any way 
other than as vacating the judgment of the trial 
court. '\Then the court says 'The judgment will 
have to be set aside,' and follows those words 
with, 'Such is the order,' it can only mean that the 
judgment is set aside, vacated and annulled, 
and, having been thus swept from existence, the 
lower court has no power to breathe into any 
part of it the breath of life. 
The intention to vacate the entire judgment 
is further evidenced by the following language 
of the remittitur: 'It is ordered, adjudged and 
decreed, that the judgment of the District Court 
be and the same is set aside.' The order having 
vacated an entire judgment, it cannot be con-
strued as affirming any part of it. 
As to whether the decision of the appellate 
court necessitates a new trial after remand, 
depends on the intention of the appellate court, 
and where there is doubt as to this, it is generally 
resolved in favor of a new trial. There is, of 
course, no doubt of the intention of the appellate 
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court where it has specifically ordered a new 
trial. and even where the appellate court has not 
specifically ordered a new trial, it is generally 
held that a new trial is intended and necessary 
where the case has been reversed and remanded 
generally, and especially where the reversal was 
for error anterior to the verdict. 
Generally a judgment of reversal embracing 
no special directions, simply vacates the judg-
ment excepted to, and it is to be fallowed by a 
new trial in the court below. "roods vs. Jones, 
56 Ga. 520 . . . " 
See also Gray vs. Defa, 153 P.2d 544, 107 
Utah 272. 
The case of Mcisaac vs. Hale, 135 A. 37, 105 
Conn. 249, involved a factual situation similar to the one 
in the present case. It was contended in the second 
trial that the finding on certain issues in the first trial 
which were recited in the opinion of the appellate court 
was binding on the trial court in the second trial. The 
Supreme Court held: 
" ... The sole ground of the present appeal 
is that the trial court had no right on the second 
trial to reopen the issue as to the improvements 
which were intended to be included in estimating 
the increased rental provided in the lease, but 
that the finding on the first trial and the decision 
by this court concluded the parties upon that 
issue. The effect of the finding of error on the 
first appeal and the remanding of the case to be 
proceeded with according to law was to destroy 
entirely the efficacy of the judgment appealed 
from and to require a new trial of all the issues 
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in the case. Lewis vs. Yale, 78 Conn. 202, 207, 
61 A. 634. The statements of fact in the opinion 
of this court were merely the adoption of the 
findings of the trial court for the purpose of the 
determination of the appeal, and gave to those 
findings no additional force . . . " 
1 t should be noted that the error for which the 
Fuoco case was reversed was anterior to the verdict. 
Under the _Madsen case it is clear that we were entitled 
to a trial de novo of all issues. 
The language of the Supreme Court decision fol-
lowing the unqualified statement that the "judgment 
of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a new 
trial" namely "with instructions to the effect that the 
judge or jury should determine the matters of whether 
the ditch was acquiesced in over a long period of time 
as a boundary and not simply as an irrigation medium" 
was obviously intended to emphasize the point on which 
the court erred in the former trial. If we should con-
strue it as a direction to determine only the one issue 
the Supreme Court would not have stated unequivo-
cably that "the judgment ... is reversed and remanded 
for a new trial," but would have simply stated that 
"the case is remanded to the trial court for the trial of 
the question as to whether the ditch was acquiesced in 
as a boundary." An order of reversal and new trial is 
entirely inconsistent with a remand for the determi-
nation of one issue. 
The second trial of this case proceeded as a trial 
de novo. No objection was made to the introduction of 
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evidence on the location of the ditch and no indication 
was given at the pre-trial that we were not to have a 
new trial on all issues. 
It is significant that in its memorandum decision 
the trial court said: 
"In passing, had the entire matter been before 
this court a different conclusion might have been 
reached." 
We submit that it was the obligation of the re-
spondents to prove in the second trial of this case the 
four elements stated in the decision of the Supreme 
Court on the first appeal, Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 
2d 156, 389 P.2d 143, as follows: 
" . . . This court over a period of years has 
formulated four elements which must be shown 
by the person claiming title by acquiescence in 
order to raise the presumption that a binding 
agreement exists settling a dispute or uncertain 
boundary. These elements are: ( l) occupation 
up to a visible line marked definitely by monu-
ments, fences or buildings and (2) acquiescence 
in the line as the boundary ( 3) for a long period 
of years ( 4) by adjoining land owners." 
The evidence referred to on pages 12-14 of the Appel-
lants' Brief should not have been ignored by the trial 
court. This shows by reference to existing physical 
features where the old ditch described by the witnesses 
was located. It wa.{/ on the record bou:ndary line desig-
nated "CD" on the map Exhibit P-1. This fact should 
have been determinative of the case. 
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2. THE RESPONDENTS HA VE FAILED 
TO CALL ATTENTION IN THEIR BRIEF 
TO ANY EVIDENCE OF 1llUTUAL RECOG-
NITION OF THE DITCH AS A BOUNDARY 
LINE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. 
The respondents' argument relating to proof of 
mutual acquiescence consists only of general references 
to testimony as to occupancy of the respondents' land 
up to the ditch. This court held on the first appeal 
that such evidence is not enough to show that the ditch 
was considered a boundary line or that the plaintiffs' 
predecessors ever acquiesced in it as a boundary line. 
Fuoco vs. Williams, supra. 
The evidence discussed on pages 15-18 of Appel-
lants' Brief relating to ( l) the record ownership of 
the two parcels of land, (2) the admitted fact that 
during the period 1939 to 1959 the Fuoco property 
was cultivated only one year, ( 3) the admitted fact 
that for 19 years the Fuoco parcel was in weeds, and 
( 4) the further admitted fact that for 10 years prior 
thereto both parcels were cultivated by the respondent 
Benjamin H. Williams' father, clearly negatives any 
proof or presumption of acquiescence in the ditch as 
a boundary line by the appellants' predecessors. There 
is no evidence that between 1896 and 1936 Melinda 
H. Butterworth ever acquiesced in the ditch as a bound-
ary line; nor is there evidence that Annie N. M. Chris-
tensen and Effie G. Butterworth acquiesced between 
1936 and 1951; nor is there evidence that between 
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1951 and 1959 H. Leland Christensen so acquiesced. 
This case was reversed on the first appeal for failure 
of proof on this point. The respondents have again 
failed to produce any evidence. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the district court should again be reversed and remanded 
and the district court should be directed to dismiss the 
respondents' counterclaim. 
E. J. SKEEN 
Attorney for Appellants 
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